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CASENOTES 
CORPORATIONS-RESTRIC1'10NS ON ALIENATION OF 
STOCK-WHEN VALID 
717 
The validity of a charter provision1 giving the directors of a 
-corporation the unrestricted power to purchase, retire, or cancel 
common stock at will was challenged by a newly-retired employee 
whose stock had been called by the company. Held: the provision 
1s See note 14 supra. 
19 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1215 (Supp. 1953). 
20 Kirby v. Omaha Bridge Commission, 127 Neb. 382, 255 N.W. 776 
(1934). 
21 This conclusion is supported by the fact that Wisconsin itself approved 
turnpike authority financing in State ex rel Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 
185, 60 N.W.2d 873 (1953), and affirmed that holding in the instant 
case by stating that turnpike bonds in Wisconsin would not constitute an 
indebtedness of the state. 
1 The provision read: " ( 7) By unanimous vote of a full board of di-
rectors of the number fixed by the stockholders at their last annual meet-
ing. all or any shares of common stock of the corporation held by such 
holder or holders as may be designated in such vote may be called at any 
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was not invalid per se and would support a call of common shares 
if not exercised arbitrarily.2 
Plaintiff's refusal to comply with the corporate decree was 
based upon his contention that the broad power of the call pro-
vision created an unreasonable "restraint on alienation." How-
ever, plaintiff had been an officer and director of the corporation 
for over 25 years, and had voted for the adoption of the chal-
lenged provision. He knew that the purpose of the provision was 
to keep all stock in the hands of active officers and directors and 
that it had been an invariable practice for retiring officers and 
directors to sell their stock either to other shareholders or to the 
corporation. While the decision is thus justified by the facts,3 
it may appear to sanction an arbitrary call power much broader 
than is required to achieve the end which motivated it, i.e., keep-
ing all stock in the hands of active officers and directors.4 
"Restraints on alienation" of stock are those restrictions 
which limit unimpeded transfer of the share from holder to holder.5 
time for purchase, or for retirement, or cancellation in connection with 
any reduction of capital stock, at the book value of such shares as deter-
mined by the board of directors as of the close of the month next pre-
ceeding such vote. Such determination, including the method thereof 
and the matters considered therein, shall be final and conclusive." Lewis 
v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 121 N.E.2d 850 (Mass. 1954). 
2 Lewis v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc .. 121 N.E.2d 850 (Mass. 1954). 
3 Plaintiff had been an employee of defendant corporation since 1913, 
and had been a member of the board of executives since 1922. He was 
assistant treasurer for twelve years. He retired as a director in 1952. 
After his retirement, he was asked to sell his stock to the corporation, 
but did not do so. The directors thereupon called l,'540 of his shares. 
Plaintiff owned 3,648 of the 215,939 outstanding common shares. All 
stock was held by officers, directors, and their families, except for some 
shares held by two charitable trusts. Plaintiff's shares were the only 
shares called, and the call was made for the first time since the adoption 
of the provision in 1925. Plaintiff had voted for the adoption of the 
provision, and twice voted in favor of reaffirming it. He purchased the 
majority of his stock after the provision had been adopted. Lewis v. H.P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc., 121 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Mass. 1954). 
4 The court read the provision in the instant case as though it limited 
use of the call power to stock of retiring officers and directors. Analogous 
provisions have been held valid. See Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 
F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1930); Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Service Corp., 352 
Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933). 
ti Fleitman v. John M. Stone Cotton Mills, 186 Fed. 466 (5th Cir. 1911); 
Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949); Mitchell 
v. Lewensohn, 251 Wis. 424, 29 N.W.2d 748 (1947); McDonald v. Farley 
& Loetscher Mfg. Co., 226 Iowa 53, 283 N.W. 261 (1939); Halsey v. 
Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 210 N.W. 209 (1926); Kom v. Cody Detective 
Agency, 76 Wash. 540, 136 Pac. 1153 (1913). 
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An unlimited power to call shares does not restrict their transfer 
in so many words but does limit the possibility of transfer in 
fact.6 Courts distinguish between "restraints on alienation" and 
limitations merely "affecting the quality" of the shares.; The 
latter characterization has been used to denote limitations on 
transferability which were not invalid or harmful per se.8 "Re-
straint" has generally been applied to more formidable obstacles 
to transfer.9 
In Delaware, the state from which Nebraska borrowed its 
corporation statutes, a leading case10 struck down a provision 
which forbade transfer without first offering the stock to the 
corporation and which rendered any stock not held by an employee 
callable at any time. The court could find no justification for 
its use.11 
Massachusetts, forum of the instant case, permits greater 
"restraint"12 than does Delaware.13 However, if the restrictions 
6 The effect of the broad language would seem to preclude any "sen-
sible" man from buying the stock. See Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, 
Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938). 
i Lewis v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 121 N.E.2d 850 (Mass 1954); 
Prindiville v. Johnson & Higgins, 92 N.J. Eq. 515, 113 Atl. 915 (1921). 
s For example the provision that, if shares were transferred to one 
who was not an officer, director, or employee, dividends would not be 
paid to the transferee unless he surrendered his shares in exchange for a 
dividend certificate. Thus, he would be entitled to dividends. but no vote. 
Prindiville v. Johnson & Higgins, 92 N.J. Eq. 515, 113 Atl. 915 (1921). 
9 For example the restriction that, if the shareholder wishes to transfer 
his shares, he shall, for a limited period, offer them first to other share-
holders or to the corporation. Of course, the corporation must have au-
thority to purchase its own shares and must have a surplus out of which 
the purchase may be made. Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. 
Ch. 1, 147 Atl. 312, aff'd, 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930). 
10 Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 
(1938). 
11 In the instant case, the court, without mentioning reasonableness or 
justification, assumed that the provision would be justifiable if it had ac-
tually read as the court construed it to read. Lewis v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 
Inc., 121 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Mass. 1954). 
12 Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 1'02, 168 N.E. 521 (1929); 
Longyear v. Hardaman, 219 Mass. 405, 106 N.E. 1012 (1914); Barrett 
v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902). 
13 Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 510, 70 A.2d 250 (1949); Greene v. 
E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938); Starring 
v. American Hair & Felt Co., 21 Del. Ch. 380, 191 Atl. 887 (1937). Ne-
braska follows Delaware in many instances. as the Nebraska corporation 
code was in large part borrowed from the Delaware code. See Ritchey 
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here were more narrowly worded, e.g., so as to be validly exercised 
only if stock were transfered to or held by a non-employee, and 
a legitimate reason for its use could be shown, Delaware, and 
thus perhaps Nebraska, would probably uphold the less ambitious 
restriction.H 
Because of its liberal rule on "restraint", Massachusetts would 
probably uphold the instant provision even where the equities15 
were appreciably weaker. But such approval is open to criticism. 
The broad language of the provision creates an effective restraint 
on alienation which may be greater than the Nebraska law would 
allow.16 It is doubtful that anyone would purchase stock subject 
to an unrestricted call power. The prerogatives of ownership 
should be determinable at the time of purchase, by resort to the 
terms of the restriction; while under the rule of the instant case, 
i.e., where provisions are not invalid per se, they would be in-
definite until the provision had been litigated.17 
and Vold, General Corporation Law of Nebraska, 21 Neb. L. Rev. 197 
(1942). However. the legitimacy of a restraint is a common law problem; 
so Nebraska would be free to follow the Massachusetts view should it so 
desire. 
14 Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 510, 70 A.2d 250 (1949); Lawson v. 
Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 1, 147 Atl. 312, aff'd, 17 Del. Ch. 
343. 152 Atl. 723 (1930). 
lu It appears that the Massachusetts court in the instant case rested its 
decision largely upon the equities involved, those concerning the plaintiff 
specifically and closely-held corporations generally. The plaintiff had long 
been affiliated with the corporation, and knew of the existence and pur-
pose of the provision. And the very purpose of a closely-held corporation 
is to maintain control in a small, integrated group. Restrictions which 
the group imposes on itself should be, and often are sustained, on a con-
tractual basis if on no other. See Baum v .Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb. 
197, 62 N.W.2d 864 (1954); Elson v. Schmidt, 140 Neb. 646, 1 N.W.2d 
314 (1941); Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 
Atl. 391 (1929); Weiland v. Hogan, 177 Mich. 626, 143 N.W. 599 (1913); 
New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894). 
16 In Miller v. Farmers' Milling & Elevator Co., 78 Neb. 441, 110 N.W. 
995 (1907), the Nebraska court struck down a provision which com-
pletely restrained alienation. The broad language of the provision in the 
instant case in effect precludes any transfer. 
17 Such a provision can be analogized to the "void for vagueness" doc-
trine of constitutional law. To satisfy the Due Process Clause, a criminal 
statute must clearly spell out to men of reasonable intelligence the acts 
which it makes criminal, so that they may keep their conduct within the 
law. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); United States v. L. 
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). 
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It is submitted that a provision in corporate articles of in-
corporation which gives the corporation power to retire, pur-
chase, or cancel common stock at will is too broad on its face, 
and substantially restrains alienation. Such a provision may be 
acceptable if used for legitimate ends by a closely-held corpora-
tion, and thus the principal case seems justifiable. However, it 
would seem wfaer for the draftsman to phrase restrictions to ad• 
here more closely to the ends sought to be attained. Otherwise, 
a sweeping provision, although enacted for legitimate purposes, 
might be stricken down as imposing an illegitimate restraint in 
a situation where a more carefully drafted clause would have 
been upheld. 
James W. Hewitt, '56 
